Social networks offer users new means of accessing information, essentially relying on "social filtering", i.e. propagation and filtering of information by social contacts. The sheer amount of data flowing in these networks, combined with the limited budget of attention of each user, makes it difficult to ensure that social filtering brings relevant content to interested users. Our motivation in this paper is to measure to what extent self-organization of a social network results in efficient social filtering.
Introduction
Information access has been revolutionized by the advent of social networks such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter. These platforms have brought about the new paradigm of "social filtering", whereby one accesses information by "following" social contacts. This is especially true for twitter-like microblogging social networks. In such networks the functions of filtering, editing and disseminating news are totally distributed, in contrast to traditional news channels. The efficiency of social filtering is critically affected by the network topology, as captured by the contact-follower relationships. Today's networks provide recommendations to users for potentially useful contacts to follow, but don't interfere any further with topology formation. In this sense, these networks self-organize, under the selfish decisions of individual users.
This begs the following question: when does such autonomous and selfish selforganizing topology lead to efficient information dissemination? The answer will in turn indicate under what circumstances self-organization is insufficient, and thus when additional mechanisms, such as incentive schemes, should be introduced.
Two parameters play a key role in this problem. On the one hand each user aims to maximize the coverage of the topics of his interest. On the other hand, a user pays with his attention: filtering interesting information from spam (i.e. information that does not fall in his topics of interest) incurs a cost. Users must therefore trade-off topic coverage against attention cost. As pointed out by Simon [22] , as information becomes abundant, another resource becomes scarce: attention.
Furthermore, there is an interplay between participants in a social network where filtering by one user may benefit another, inducing complex dependencies in decisions on creating connections. To model this, we introduce a network formation game called flow game where some users produce news about specific topics and each user is interested in receiving all news about a set of topics specific to him. Each user is a selfish agent that can choose its incoming connections within a certain budget of attention in order to maximize the coverage of his set of topics of interest.
This model is of interest on its own, as it enriches the class of existing network formation games with a focus on flow dissemination under bounded connections. This model could also be of interest in the context of peer-to-peer streaming and file sharing or publish/subscribe applications.
Our results
An important feature in our model is a user's budget of attention for the consumption of content. In previous work [13] the budget of attention was modelled as a limit on the rate with which a user consults a friend, with a different objective of minimizing delay in receiving all content. In the present work we are interested in a more fundamental question, of how efficient social networks are formed in the first place. We consider the model where users are interested in specific subsets of topics and their objective is to maximize the number of flows received corresponding to these topics. As such, we model the budget of attention as a constraint on the number of connections a user may create (rather than a rate of consultation). Our aim is to build a simple model capturing the complexity of the problem. This way of capturing the budget of attention amounts to assuming that each connection consumes the same amount of attention. We discuss in the conclusion how we could tweak our model to more finely model attention consumption.
We capture users' interests in topics through user-specific values for each topic and define the utility a user receives to be the sum of values of all received topics. Each user's objective in a flow game is then to choose connections so as to maximize his utility. We additionally assume that a user may produce news about one topic at most even if he redistributes other topics. This is coherent with an empirical study of twitter traces [5] where it is shown that ordinary users (as opposed to celebrities or newspapers) can gain influence by concentrating on a single topic.
Our main results relate to the stability and efficiency of the formation of information flows. We derive conditions where selfish dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.We then give approximation ratios bounding the quality of an equilibrium compared to an optimal solution. This is traditionally measured through the price of anarchy, the ratio of the global welfare (measured as the sum of user utilities) at an optimal solution compared to that at the worst equilibrium.
Related work
Information spread in networks has been studied extensively. Much of the past work study the properties of information diffusion on given networks with given sharing protocols. Our goal in this work is to study how networks form when users create connections with the objective of efficient content dissemination in a game-theoretical approach. This work thus follows the large amount of work in network formation games. However, to the best of our knowledge, the objective of efficient information dissemination under edge constraints and interest sets that we consider here is novel. We now discuss some work in those domains that are most relevant to this paper.
Network formation games have been considered in previous work in economics and in the context of the formation of Internet peering relations and peer-to-peer overlay networks. Economic models of network formation [12] use edges to represent social relations and it is typically assumed that the creation of an edge needs bilateral agreement since both users benefit from an edge. Our model is oriented and unilateral agreement is more relevant to the notion of following in social networks. A non-cooperative one-way link connection game has been considered been in previous work [3] , where each created link incurs a cost and users are interested in connecting to all other users. Our model is richer and more realistic where we consider connections to subsets of information flows that hold user-specific intrinsic values.
Network creation games in the context of the Internet have been considered [18] , where distributed formation of undirected edges with a linear cost on each edge formed is studied. In such games, each user's objective is to minimize total formation cost while either minimizing distance to all other users [7] , or ensuring connection to a given subset of nodes [2] . We consider a bound on edge costs, in the form of a limit on the number of in-edges at each node, and further, we focus on connections that allow specific flows of information.
Interestingly, bounded budget network formation games have already been considered. Bounded budget connection games [15] consider a bound on each user's budget in creating edges, with the objective being the minimization of the sum of weighted distances to other nodes. A similar model is considered in [4] where each user's objective is to maximize his influence, measured using betweenness centrality. In our work however, rather than minimizing distance to any node, we consider a formation game with the objective of ensuring connections to a subset of flows of interest, without regard to the particular nodes.
The notion of connecting to users that can provide a content flow of interest is similar to peer-to-peer live streaming systems [16] . Unlike peer-to-peer streaming, we do not aim to satisfy flow rates, rather our aim is to connect to as many sets of relevant flows as possible. Moreover, our model allows differing user interests.
To the best of our knowledge the only work considering content dissemination with some game-theoretical approach concerns the b-matching and acyclic preference systems studied in the context of peer-to-peer applications [10] . As a generalization of the stable marriages problem, those systems consider configurations of undirected edges based on mutual acceptance of an edge, whereas unilateral decision is more suitable in our model. Our model is more intricate in the sense that connections are based not only on preferences but also on complementarity of content obtained through various connections.
In Section 5 we model the space of user interests by a metric space with low doubling dimension. Modeling interests of users through a metric space seems a natural approach and bounded growth metrics, or more generally doubling metrics, have shown to be very a general model [19] that can capture general situations, while still providing an algorithmic perspective. The doubling dimension extends the notion of dimension from Euclidean spaces to arbitrary metric spaces. It has proven to be useful in many application domains such as nearest neighbor queries to databases [6] , network construction [1] , closest server selction [14] , etc. Doubling metrics have notably been used to model distances in networks such as Internet [9] .
Organization of the paper
Section 2 introduces the model. We study the case of homogeneous interests in Section 3. The heterogeneous case in its full generality is considered in Section 4 which details some negative results. Section 5 is dedicated to the specific scenario where users' interests are captured by a doubling metric, enabling some positive results. We finally conclude in Section 6 describing potential extensions of the current work.
Model
We consider a social network where users interested in some set of content topics (or subjects) connect to (or follow in social networking parlance) other users in order to obtain such contents, materialized by flows of news. Each user may produce news for at most one topic (but may forward news from other topics she is interested in). To distinguish the role of publisher from that of follower, we technically assume that news concerning a given topic (or subject) are produced at a given node called producer which is identified with that topic.
A flow game is defined as a tuple (V, P, S, ∆) where V is a set of users, P a set of producers (or subjects or topics) and S : V → P is a function associating to each user u its interest set S u ⊆ P , and ∆ : V → N is a function associating to each user u its budget of attention ∆ u . We let n = |V | and p = |P | denote the number of users and producers respectively. A flow game is homogeneous if all users have the same interest set: S u = P for all u ∈ V . If this is not the case, the game is said to be heterogeneous.
A strategy for user u is a subset
is an upper bound on the in-degree of u). For all (v, u) ∈ F u , we say that u follows v or equivalently that u is connected to v (such a link (v, u) created by u is oriented according to the data flow, that is from v to u). The collection F = {F u : u ∈ V } forms a network defined by the directed graph G(F ) = (V ∪P, E(F )) where E(F ) = ∪ u∈V F u . A user u is interested in a subject s if s ∈ S u . A user u receives a subject s ∈ P if there exists a directed path from s to u in G(F ) such that all intermediate nodes are interested in s. This is where filtering occurs: a user retransmit only subjects she is interested in. The utility U u (F ) for user u is the number of subjects in S u she receives. The utility of u is maximized if U u (F ) = |S u |.
We denote by move, a shift from a collection F of strategies to a collection F ′ where a single user u changes her strategy from a set F u to another F ′ u . (We say that u rewires her connections.) The move is selfish if U u (F ′ ) > U u (F ). Selfish dynamics (or dynamics for short) are the sequences of selfish moves. We say that dynamics converge if any sequence of selfish moves is necessarily finite. The network is at equilibrium (or stable) if no selfish move is possible. In standard game-theoretic terminology, this corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium. The global welfare of the system is defined as the overall system utility: U = u∈V U u . The efficiency of selfish, self-organization of a game is classically captured by the notion of price of anarchy defined as the ratio of the optimal global welfare over the global welfare of the worst equilibrium: PoA =
, where F denotes the set of possible collection of strategies and E ⊆ F denotes the set of equilibria.
In some of our proofs we make use of the notion of potential functions. An ordinal (or general [8] ) potential function [17] is a function f :
, f is called an exact potential function. This notion was introduced by Monderer and Shapley [17] who show that it is tightly related to the notion of a congestion game [20] . The use of potential functions is a standard technique to show convergence of dynamics and to bound price of anarchy [8, 21] .
Homogeneous interests
We first consider the case where all users have identical sets of interests, S u = P , for all u ∈ V (G). In this context, we first establish an upper bound on the price of anarchy. We will then show convergence of dynamics.
Price of Anarchy
We first derive a simple upper bound on the overall system utility under an optimal centrally designed configuration. Clearly, any user u cannot achieve utility larger than p, which corresponds to obtaining all the subjects in P . Moreover, he cannot obtain more subjects than the aggregate budget of attention of all users, that is u∈V (G) ∆ u = n∆, where ∆ is the average in-degree per node. We can slightly improve this bound by restricting ourselves to the more interesting case where all users have budget less than p and where there are at least two users with budget at least 2. One can easily see that the optimal solution then consists in forming an oriented ring between users whose budget is at least 2 and then connecting budget 1 users to some user of the ring. All remaining connections are used to obtain distinct subjects. Each node then receives the same set of subjects. As each node connects to a non-producer, the number of subjects gathered is at most u∈V (G) ∆ u − 1. We thus obtain that the maximal utility U * a user can get is:
We now consider a distributed setting where each user selfishly rewires his incoming connections if he can improve his utility, i.e., if this allows him to receive more subjects. The following proposition shows that with homogeneous user interests and budget of attention at least 3, self organization is efficient if dynamics converge, achieving a price of anarchy close to 1.
Proposition 1
Assume that 3 ≤ ∆ u < p for every user u ∈ V of a homogeneous flow game. Then under any equilibrium the utility of a user is at least
his optimal utility. The price of anarchy is thus at most 1 + 1/(∆ − 2), approaching 1 for large ∆.
We first note that the above proposition is tight in the sense that high price of anarchy can arise when ∆ u ≤ 2 for all user u, as shown in Figure 1 . In this particular case, a doubly linked chain forms a Nash equilibrium gathering only two subjects in total while an oriented cycle gathers n subjects. The price of anarchy is thus n/2. Before proving Proposition 1, we establish two lemmas. To establish Proposition 1, we use two lemmas. The first one allows to show the existence of strongly connected components at equilibrium.
Lemma 1
If an equilibrium is reached such that there exists a path x, u 1 , . . . , u k where x is a producer, u k has in-degree bound ∆ u k ≥ 3 and a producer y is not received by u k , then there is a path from u k to u 1 .
Proof. The existence of the path x, u 1 , . . . , u k first implies that R(u 1 ) ⊂ R(u k ). Since ∆ u k ≥ 3, u k must be connected to two nodes v and w distinct from u k−1 . We first claim that v must bring at least one unique subject z 1 (different from x), otherwise, u k could unfollow v and follow y instead. Similarly, w must bring at least one unique subject z 2 (different from x and z 1 ). Then if there is no path from u k to u 1 , u 1 would unfollow x and follow u k instead, so that he only loses one subject x but gains at least two subjects z 1 and z 2 . ✷
The second Lemma aims at using the fact that users will tend to avoid redundant links at equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Consider a strongly connected graph G with n nodes and m arcs (multiple arcs are allowed). If m ≥ 2n − 1, then G contains a transitivity arc (i.e. an arc (s, t) such that there exists a directed path from s to t).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on n. The hypothesis is true for n = 1 (a self-loop on vertex s is a transitivity arc for the empty directed path from s to s). We denote by n(G) the number of nodes in the graph G and by m(G) the number of edges in the graph G. Now consider n > 1 and assume that the property is true for any graph G ′ with n(G ′ ) < n. Consider a strongly connected graph G with n nodes containing no transitivity arc. Since n ≥ 2, G must contain a circuit, i.e. an oriented cycle, with k ≥ 2 nodes. The only arcs connecting two nodes of the circuit are the circuit arcs (otherwise, we would encounter a transitivity arc). Consider the graph G ′ obtained by contracting the circuit to one node. We have m(G ′ ) = m(G) − k and n(G ′ ) = n(G) − k + 1 < n. Note that G ′ does not contain a transitivity arc either. Our induction hypothesis thus implies that m(
The property is thus satisfied for n. ✷
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Proof.[of Proposition 1] Consider any equilibrium. Assume that a user u receives less than p subjects. u must be connected to some producer x by a path x, u 1 , . . . , u k = u. Consider the graph G ′ induced by users reachable from u 1 that receive less than p subjects. By Lemma 1, G ′ is strongly connected and all its users receive the same number p ′ < p of subjects.
We claim that two users u and v of G ′ cannot follow the same producer y. As there exists a path from u to v, the link (y, v) would be redundant and v would be better off following some unreceived subject instead. Moreover, the fact that users in G ′ do not receive all subjects implies that they have spent all their budget of attention. We thus conclude that the number of edges in
First consider the case p ′ ≤ p − 2. Suppose there exists a user w / ∈ V (G ′ ). he cannot receive two subjects not received in G ′ otherwise u 1 would unfollow x and connect to w. As ∆ w ≥ 3, w can gather the p ′ subjects received in G ′ plus two others by connecting to one node in G ′ plus the two corresponding producers, a contradiction as this would increase his utility. We thus conclude that G ′ indeed contains all users, implying p ′ ≥ n(∆ − 2). Using (1), the utility of each user is at least
Finally, in all remaining cases to consider, all users receive at least p − 1 subjects. The utility of each user is thus at least
Convergence of Dynamics
We have thus shown that stable configurations of self-organizing networks with homogeneous user interests are efficient. However, do network dynamics converge to an equilibrium ? The following proposition answers this question in the affirmative.
Proposition 2 Any homogeneous flow game has an ordinal potential function, implying that selfish dynamics always converge to an equilibrium in finite time.
Proof. Let n i denote the number of users that receive i subjects and consider the sequence (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n p ). We show that this sequence always decreases according to lexicographic ordering when users make selfish moves. The function − 0≤i≤p n i n p−i is thus a potential function that will always increase until a local maximum is reached, proving convergence to an equilibrium. Consider a user u that is receiving i subjects and that will make a selfish move to receive j > i subjects instead. Note that there is no path from u to any other user receiving k < i subjects. Therefore any change by u will not affect these users. Now consider any user v with k ≥ i subjects. If there is no path from u to v then u's selfish move does not affect v. If there is such a path, then v will now receive at least j > i subjects. We thus now have n i − 1 users receiving i subjects, and the sequence (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n p ) has decreased according to lexicographic ordering. ✷ Our proof yields a very loose bound of n p+1 on convergence time. We leave as an open question whether exponential time of convergence can really arise. However,in the following proposition we show that a homogeneous flow game with at least 4 subjects, a user with budget of attention at least 2 and a user with budget of attention at least 3, is not equivalent to a congestion game. This rules out the possibility of using techniques similar to [8] to find equilibria in polynomial time, and more generally to easily bound convergence time. Note that a game is equivalent to a congestion game iff it admits an exact potential function [17] . Proof. To show this, it is sufficient to exhibit a 4-cycle in the strategy space such that the sum of utility variations over the 4 moves is non-zero. (The variation of an exact potential potential function along the cycle would obviously be zero and would also have to be equal to that sum, leading to a contradiction as shown more formally in [17] .) Without loss of generality, the game contains four producers {a, b, c, d} and two users u, v with ∆ u ≥ 2 and ∆ v ≥ 3 as depicted in Figure 2 . User u can adopt in particular strategy
where user u moves from strategy A to B increasing its utility by 1, then v moves from C to D and increases its utility by 1, then u moves back to A with a utility variation of -1, and finally v moves back to C increasing its utility by 1 again. The overall sum is thus 2 = 0. ✷ 
Heterogeneous interests
We now consider the more realistic case where users have differing sets of interests. To make the model even more general, we assume here that users weight independently topics. Let W u (s) denote the weight (or value) of topic s to user u. The objective of a user is now to maximize the sum of the values of subjects he receives. We will consider user-interest sets S u ⊆ P that include topics of sufficiently high value, that is S u = {s : W u (s) > 0}. The threshold ω u serves as a filtering threshold, allowing more or less stringent filtering. Such user-specific weights for topics represent a natural expertise or focussed interest users may have on a subset of topics. (Note that the model presented previously corresponds to W u (s) = 1 for s ∈ S u , W u (s) = 0 for s / ∈ S u .) Here we assume user u is interested in a subset S u ⊆ P of topics. For the sake of simplicity, we assume P = ∪ u∈V (G) S u . As a user may connect to other users whose interest sets differ from his own, he potentially receives subjects out of his interest set. The user may not have the resources to process and store this irrelevant information. We thus assume a natural filtering rule, where a user only retransmits subjects that are in his own interest set.
Price of Anarchy
We now show that the price of anarchy of such a system may be unbounded.
Proposition 4 In a heterogeneous flow game, the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large: specific choices yield a PoA of
Proof. We show the result through an example, illustrated in Figure 3 . For integer k, consider a system with n = 2k users having budget of attention ∆ ≥ 2 each, and p = 2(∆ − 1)k producers. We distinguish two set of users {a 1 , . . . , a k } and {b 1 , . . . , b k }. Similarly, the producers are partitionned into groups {A 1 , . . . , A k } and {B 1 , . . . , B k } where each A i (resp. B i ) contains ∆ − 1 producers.
As illustrated in Figure 3 (a), each user a i has a value of 1 for each topic in A i ∪B i and additionally the first element of each A j for j = i. Similarly, each user b i has a value of 1 for each topic in A i ∪ B i and additionally the first element of each B j for j = i. Users have a value of zero for all other topics.
A benchmark configuration is shown in Figure 3 (b), with two oriented rings, one for users a i , i = 1, . . . , k and one for users b i , i = 1, . . . , k. User a i is connected to a i−1 (with a 0 corresponding to a k ) and to all producers in A i . User b i is connected to b i−1 (with b 0 corresponding to b k ) and to all producers in B i . The corresponding utility is n(n/2 + ∆ − 2), so that the optimal global welfare U * satisfies U * ≥ n 2 /2.
The configuration shown in Figure 3(c) is an equilibrium, where each user a i (resp. b i ) connects to producers in A i (resp. B i ) and to b i (resp. a i ). The global utility here is U = n(2∆ − 2) ≤ 2n∆, and the price of anarchy is thus at least 
Convergence of dynamics
We have shown that the price of anarchy can be unbounded with respect to the number of users in some cases.
We now show that selfish dynamics do not even guarantee convergence to a Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Selfish dynamics of a flow game with heterogeneous utilities may not converge.
Proof. Consider the following scenario with six retransmitting users p i , q i , r i , i = 1, 2, and two users u 1 , u 2 each with degree ∆ i = 3. The retransmitting users publish sets of topics as follows: p 1 : {a, b}, p 2 : {c, d}, q 1 : {x, y}, r 1 : {k, l}, q 2 : {x, k}, r 2 : {y, l} . The user-specific values are given in Table 1 , where ǫ ≪ 1. As depicted in Figure 4 , each agent u i uses one connection to follow user p i through whom he receives a total value of 4. He also connect to the other user u 3−i to receive another topic of value 2 from p 3−i . Now each user u i must select between q 1 , q 2 , r 1 and r 2 for his third connection. We start with users u 1 and u 2 choosing q 1 and q 2 respectively. They thus receive 8 + ǫ and 7 + 2ǫ in total respectively. User u 2 then selects r 2 , receiving 8 + ǫ, and this changes user u 1 's utility to 7 + 2ǫ. However user u 1 can increase his utility by 1−ǫ, and does so by switching to r 1 . This decreases u 2 's utility by 1 − ǫ since he doesn't receive x anymore (but now receives k). He can improve his utility by selecting q 1 . Denote the state of the system by (S(u 1 ), S(u 2 )) where S(u i ) is user u i 's strategy in selecting between q i and r i . Under selfish moves, the system may cycle as follows: With an arbitrary structure of user interest sets, we have thus shown that the price of anarchy may be unbounded, and dynamics may not converge. The question of determining if pure Nash equilibria exist is left open.
Structured interest sets
We now revisit the efficiency of social filtering in an heterogeneous scenario, where interest sets are no longer arbitrary but instead are organized according to a well behaved geometry. Specifically we assume the following model. A metric d is given on a set P ′ ⊇ P of subjects. The interest set S u of each user u then coincides with a ball B(s u , R u ) in this metric, specified by a central subject s u and a radius of interest R u . In other words, we assume that the value of a subject to a user is non-increasing in its distance from s u . Specifically, we assume
where f (·) is a non-increasing positive function, and W u (s) = 0 otherwise. Without loss of generality, we can assume P ′ = {s u : u ∈ V } ∪ P and S u = B(s u , R u ) ∩ P . We shall first give conditions on the metric d and the sets S u under which an efficient configuration exists. We will then introduce modified dynamics and filtering rules which guarantee stability, i.e. convergence to an equilibrium. A flow game where interest sets can be defined in this way is called a metric flow game.
The model can easily be generalized to more eclectic user interests where topics a user is interested in correspond to the disjoint union of a constant number of balls. We leave out the details of such generalizations so as to keep the focus of the paper. However, we include a brief discussion later in the section, in the context of Proposition 6.
Sufficient conditions for optimal utility
Consider the following properties of the interest set geometry.
1. γ-doubling: d is γ-doubling, i.e. for any subject s and radius R, the ball B(s, R) can be covered by γ balls of radius R/2: there exists I ⊂ S such that |I| ≤ γ and B(s, R) ⊂ ∪ t∈I B(t, R/2).
2. r-covering: r is a covering radius, i.e. any subject s ∈ P is at distance at most r from the central subject s u of some user u with interest radius R u ≥ r.
3. (r, δ)-sparsity: there are at most δ subjects within distance r: |B(s, r)| ≤ δ, ∀s.
4. r-interest-radius regularity: for any users u, v with d(s u , s v ) < 3R u /2 + r, we have R v ≥ R u /2 + r (users with similar interests have comparable interest radii).
Property (1) is a classical generalization of dimension from Euclidean geometry to abstract metric spaces (an Euclidean space with dimension k is 2 Θ(k) -doubling). This is a natural assumption if user interests can be modeled by proximity in a hidden low-dimensional space. Property (2) states that all subjects are within distance r from some user's center of interest and can thus be seen as an assumption of minimum density of users' interests over the whole set P of available subjects. Property (3) puts an upper bound on the density of subjects. In other words, we assume a level of granularity under which we do not distinguish subjects. Property (4) is another form of regularity assumption, requiring some smoothness in the radii of interests of nearby users. This may be the most debatable assumption, for instance if we consider the case of an expert next to an amateur. However, if we assume that a topic is split into several subjects according to the level of expertise required to understand the corresponding news, the assumption becomes more natural as an expert is still interested in related subjects (with lower level of understanding) and an amateur still has some focus if the correct number of levels is considered.
We now show that an optimal solution exists, i.e. one in which each user receives all subjects in his interest set, as soon as his budget of attention is at least γδ + γ 2 log Rm r where R m is the maximum radius of interest over all users. This will be a direct consequence of the following proposition. This result can easily be extended to the case where each user interest set is given by a disjoint union of balls (the number of balls being at most a constant b). It suffices to repeat the construction of the proof for each ball, resulting in a factor b in the resulting required budget of attention. The assumptions have to be slightly modified so that any subject is covered by some ball of a user (in the covering assumption) and that two nearby balls have comparable radii (in the regularity assumption).
Proof. We define the ball B u,i := B(s u , min(R u , 2 i r)) for each user u and each integer i ≥ 0. The construction to follow will ensure that u collects all subjects in B u,i through a set N u,i of contacts such that B u,i ⊂ ∪ v∈N u,i B v,i−1 .
We first define N u,1 = {p s : s ∈ B u,1 }. Now, for 2 ≤ i ≤ log Ru r , the γ-doubling assumption implies that B u,i can be covered by at most γ 2 balls of radius 2 i−2 r: there exists a set L u,i of at most γ 2 subjects such that B u,i ⊂ ∪ s∈L u,i B(s, 2 i−2 r). From the r-covering assumption, we can then define a set N u,i of at most γ 2 users such that each s ∈ L u,i is at distance at most r from some s v with v ∈ N u,i . We then have B u,i ⊂ ∪ v∈N u,i B(s v , 2 i−2 r + r). Without loss of generality, we can assume that for each s ∈ L u,i , B(s, 2 i−2 r) intersects B u,i (otherwise s can safely be removed from L u,i as it does not cover anything useful). We thus have d(s u , s) ≤ R u + 2 i−2 r < 3R u /2 (note that 2 i−1 r < R u as i ≤ log Flow correctness: We show by induction on i that each user u receives all subjects in B u,i . The direct connection to producers for subjects in B u,1 ensures this for i = 1. For i > 1, the induction hypothesis implies that each user v ∈ N u,i receives all subjects in B v,i−1 . From B u,i ⊂ ∪ v∈N u,i B v,i−1 , we conclude that u will receive news about subjects in B u,i from its contacts in N u,i . As S u = B u,⌈log Ru r ⌉ , we finally know that u receives all subjects in S u .
In-degree bound: First, we have |N u,1 | ≤ γδ. This comes from the fact that B u,1 is included in at most γ balls of radius r from the γ-doubling assumption, and each of these balls contains at most δ subjects from the (r, δ)-sparsity assumption. Second, we have already seen that |N u,i | ≤ γ 2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ log Ru r . We thus obtain the bound γδ + γ 2 log Ru r
The core of the construction consists in covering a a given ball radius of 2 i r with a set of γ balls of radius 2 i−1 r. As a covering set of γ 2 balls can be computed through a simple greedy covering algorithm [11] , a solution where the required budget of attention is within a factor γ from the bound of Proposition 6 can thus be computed in polynomial time.
As previously mentioned, a budget of attention of ∆ = γδ + γ 2 log Rm r per user is thus enough for maximum utility. This scales logarithmically in R m , while under the assumptions of the theorem one can arrange interest sets to have size polynomial in R m (take for example interests to be regularly placed on a lattice). Thus this configuration gives substantial savings in comparison to one where users would connect directly to all their subjects.
Clearly the configuration graph identified in this theorem is an equilibrium: as maximum utility is reached, no user can increase its utility by reconnecting. We now study conditions that guarantee convergence of dynamics.
Sufficient conditions for stability
We first define two rules regarding republication of subjects received and reconnections.
1. Expertise-filtering rule: when a user u is connected to a user v, u only receives subjects
2. Nearest-subject rule for re-connection: when reconnecting, each user u gives priority to subjects that are closer to s u : a new subject s is gained by u so that no subject t with d(s u , t) < d(s u , s) is lost. (On the other hand, any subject t with d(s u , t) > d(s u , s) can be lost.)
Rule 1 can be interpreted as follows. The center of expertise of a user is the same as its center of interest, and the distance d also captures expertise of users about subjects, in that u is more expert than v on subject s if and only if d(s u , s) ≤ d(s v , s). The rule then amounts to a sanity check where u discards news from sources that have less expertise than himself on the subject. We capture with the following slight variation of the model. A flow game with expertise-filtering is a flow game where reception of a subject s by user u occurs only when there exists a directed path s = u 0 , . . . , u k = u from s to u such that for each
Rule 2 states that a user u prefers to receive a subject he is more interested in (i.e. closer to s u ) rather than any number of subjects that are less interesting. A flow game is denoted to be with nearest-subject priority if the utility function of each user u is defined by U u (F ) = max {R : u receives all s ∈ B(s u , R)}.
Proposition 7 Any metric flow game with expertise-filtering and nearest-subject priority has an ordinal potential function, implying that selfish dynamics always converge to an equilibrium in finite time.
The proof shows the existence of an ordinal potential function. As in the previous section, the bound on convergence time implied by the above proof is very loose. We leave open the question of determining better bounds or faster convergence conditions. Proof. Consider the set D = d(s, t) : s, t ∈ P ′ 2 of all possible distances. Let r 1 , . . . , r m denote all elements of D sorted in increasing order (i.e. r 1 < · · · < r m ). Let n i denote the number of pairs (u, s) such that d(s u , s) = r i and u receives s. Consider the tuple (n 1 , . . . , n m ). When a user u makes a selfish move, it increases its utility by receiving a new subject s. Let i denote the index such that d(s u , s) = r i . Any lost subject t must satisfy d(s u , t) > d(s u , s) by the nearest-subject rule. If a lost subject t was received by some user v through a path from u to v, we have d(s v , t) ≥ d(s u , t) by the expertise-filtering rule. We thus deduce d(s v , t) > d(s u , s), implying that n j can decrease only for j > i. The tuple (n 1 , . . . , n m ) thus increases according to the lexicographical order after any selfish move. The function
is thus a potential function that will always increase until a local maximum is reached, proving convergence to an equilibrium. ✷
We are now ready to prove the following: Proof. Consider a configuration where some users do not receive some subject in their interest ball. Let (u, s) be a user-subject unsatisfied pair such that d(s u , s) is minimal. Consider the smallest integer i such that d(s u , s) ≤ 2 i r holds. According to the construction of Proposition 6, user u can receive all subjects in B u,i = B(s u , min(R u , 2 i r)) as long as every user v receives all subjects in his ball of radius min(R v , 2 i−1 r) which is the case according to the choice of the pair (u, s). Note that this construction follows the expertise filtering rule as each subject at distance greater than 2 i−1 r is retrieved through a user at distance at most 2 i−1 r from the subject. User u can retrieve B u,i using at most γδ+γ 2 (i−1) connections. The configuration is thus unstable as long as ∆ u ≥ γδ + γ 2 (i − 1) which is the case for ∆ u ≥ γδ + γ 2 log Ru r . Since the system must stabilize to some equilibrium according to Proposition 7, every user u must receive all news about subjects in S u in that stable configuration. ✷ Interestingly, the above proof implies that the convergence is fast: as soon as all users receive their ball of radius 2 i−1 r, one reconnection by each user will allow him to receive his ball of radius 2 i r (expertise-filtering and nearest-subject priority ensure that other users will not lose subjects at distance less than 2 i r). Convergence is thus achieved after log Rm r rounds where each round consists in letting each user reconnect once (or more).
Concluding remarks
We have shown that a flow game can have complex dynamics that may not converge. However, we can prove convergence to efficient equilibrium for both homogeneous flow games (with very weak assumptions) and metric flow games (with more technical assumptions). While our proofs give exponential bounds on convergence time in general, we get linear convergence time (up to a logarithmic factor) for structured interest set with expertise-filtering and nearest-subject priority, showing that understanding the structure of interests and its relation to forwarding mechanisms is a key aspect of information flow in social networks. Direct follow up of this work concerns the study of the speed of convergence in general and the characterization of flow games having pure Nash equilibria.
Our model makes several simplifying assumptions. A natural generalization would be to consider a real-valued cost of attention for establishing a link (v, u) instead of a unitary cost. The cost of establishing link (v, u) could typically be a function of S u and S v . A natural cost taking into account the attention required to filter out uninteresting content would then be c(v, u) = |Sv| |Su∩Sv| , for example. A dual variant of our model could be to consider that every user gathers all the subjects he is interested in while he tries to minimize the required cost of attention. We could also mix both models, using utility functions combining coverage of interest set and cost of attention (the function being increasing in the number of interesting subjects received and decreasing in the costs of attention of the formed links).
In that context, we believe the two following directions are promising for efficient social dissemination. First, incentive mechanisms, e.g. reputation counters maintained by users, or payments between users, may considerably augment the performance of self-organizing social flows. Second, more elaborate content filtering between contact-follower pairs may also lead to substantial improvements. We have already introduced expertise filtering, which could translate into implementable mechanisms in existing social networking platforms. More generally there appears to be a rich design space of filtering rules based on combinations of interests and expertise.
